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This article provides the results of a European Commission study into the compatibility of 
UEFA’s "home grown player rule" (the Rule) with EU laws on free movement of workers. 
The Rule was introduced to increase competitive balance, and improve the training and 
development of young players in European football, but gives rise to indirect nationality 
discrimination and has the potential to restrict the ability of EU footballers to be employed 
by clubs in other Member States. Our analysis indicates that, although UEFA’s aims are 
legitimate under EU law, the Rule has resulted in only a modest impact and it cannot at this 
stage be deemed to have satisfied proportionality control. The existence of potentially less 
restrictive alternatives means that UEFA should engage in social dialogue with its 
stakeholders to determine if other methods could be employed to achieve these aims without 
recourse to regulations that are intrinsically liable to infringe rules governing the free 
movement of EU workers.  
Introduction  
The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) is recognised as a confederation of 54 
national associations responsible for governing football in Europe,
1
 with the right to adopt 
rules specific to that continent. The focus of this article is UEFA’s "home grown player rule" 
(the Rule) which was introduced at the start of the 2006/07 season and requires every football 
team entering European club competitions to name eight "home grown" players in their 25-
man squad.
2
 Four of these players must be "club-trained", defined as a player who, 
irrespective of his nationality and age, has been registered with his current club for a period 
of three entire seasons or of 36 months while between the age of 15 and 21. Four of 
these*E.L. Rev. 494  players must be "association-trained"; these fulfil the same criteria but 
with another club in the same national association. If a club fails to meet these quotas the 
maximum number of players on the squad list for the competition is reduced accordingly. 
The introduction of the Rule forms part of a series of regulatory measures (including a Club 
Licensing System and "Financial Fair Play" regulations) adopted by UEFA in response to the 
perceived deleterious consequences of the Bosman judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU).
3
 Bosman, and the relationship between sport and EU law, has been 
debated in length elsewhere,
4
 but in brief the ruling liberalised the European labour market in 
professional football by rendering unlawful two established rules. First, the CJEU held that 
rules limiting the right to participate in professional or semi-professional football matches to 
nationals of the State in question were prohibited by what is now art.45 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Secondly, the Court struck down a rule stating 
that a footballer who is a national of one Member State could not, on the expiry of his 
contract with a club, be employed by a club of another Member State unless the latter club 
paid a transfer, training or development fee to the former. 
UEFA believe that Bosman, in conjunction with the commercialisation of football generated 
by developments in the European media sector, has contributed to a number of negative 
trends in European football.
5
 They contend that there has been a reduction in "competitive 
balance" across European football as the best players gravitate to the richest clubs, thus 
calling into question the unpredictability of match and championship outcomes. This has 
been exacerbated by the practice of clubs "hoarding players", and has exposed clubs to 
financial risk as they develop business models based on recruitment via the transfer system 
and the paying of unsustainable player remuneration as opposed to investing in the 
development of young local talent. Not only does this pose a risk in terms of the throughput 
of playing talent, it also severs the link between clubs and their localities and weakens 
national teams by narrowing the pool of talent available to a national association to select 
from. From UEFA’s perspective, the Rule, in conjunction with its club licensing system, 
which sets minimum youth training infrastructure standards and incentivises youth training at 
clubs, serves to restore a measure of competitive balance at European club competition level 
(and at domestic level where national associations implement the Rule). 
As with the quota system outlawed in Bosman, the operation of the Rule raises a potential 
conflict with EU laws on free movement of workers. In the 2007 White Paper on Sport, the 
European Commission stated that the Rule could be accepted as being compatible with 
Treaty provisions on free movement of persons if it did not lead to any direct discrimination 
based on nationality and if possible indirect discriminatory effects could be justified as being 
proportionate to a legitimate objective pursued, such as to enhance and protect the training 
and development of talented young players.
6
 A Commission-funded study in 2008 concluded 
that the Rule responded in a proportionate manner to a legitimate objective and should be 
considered compatible with EU law.
7
 In contrast, academic comment on the Rule’s legality 
has been sceptical from the outset, although the works have been largely speculative owing to 
the lack of data*E.L. Rev. 495  on the effectiveness of the Rule.
8
 The tentative support for the 
Rule provided by a joint press release issued in 2008 by the European Commissioners 
responsible for free movement of workers and for sport
9
 was subject to a further analysis of 
the consequences of the Rule to be undertaken by 2012.
10
 In the 2011 Communication on 
Sport, the Commission formally committed itself to this new Study
11
 and the contract to 
undertake it was awarded to the authors of this article. The Study required the authors to 
assess the Rule in light of art.45 and art.165 TFEU. The authors were not requested to 
examine the compatibility of the Rule with other Treaty provisions, such as art.101 and 
art.102 TFEU, or other potential causes of action such as age discrimination. This article 
presents the findings of this Study
12
 and does not necessarily represent the official position of 
the European Commission. 
Methodology  
In assessing the compatibility of the Rule under art.45 TFEU, the research team adopted an 
orthodox legal approach to the question of whether the Rule was liable to hinder or render 
less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. This approach 
was based on the CJEU’s reasoning in Gebhard that in order to be compatible with EU free 
movement law, measures liable to restrict free movement must be,  
"applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements 
in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it." 
13
  
An assessment of this four-stage test forms the structural basis of this article. 
In considering the suitability of the Rule in securing the stated objectives, the research team 
were instructed to focus on the two strongest submissions by UEFA: that the Rule promotes 
competitive balance and incentivises youth training. The team looked to establish whether the 
Rule could be directly connected to improvements in either of these objectives. In doing so it 
compiled a set of descriptive statistics which presented an overview of the trends in the 
numbers of home grown players, their origin, and the frequency with which they play in 
comparison with other players. However, it was not possible from that data alone*E.L. Rev. 
496  to help to infer causation in relation to the impact of the Rule on competitive balance 
and youth training, so additional methods were employed. 
To statistically infer the impact of the Rule on competitive balance, regression analysis was 
performed for the Champions League and Europa League competitions, and for the 
performance of teams in the group stages, and then their progression to the various final 
stages. Semi- and unstructured interviews with football stakeholders were also undertaken. 
To assess the impact on youth training and development at EU clubs—in support of the 
descriptive statistics—the team carried out a series of qualitative interviews with UEFA, the 
European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL), the European Club Association (ECA), the 
English Premier League and the Fédération Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs 
Professionnels (FIFPro). 
To supplement this, and corroborate opinions canvassed from the stakeholders, qualitative 
semi-structured interviews were also carried out with qualified personnel at a sample of 
professional clubs across the European Union.
14
 The interviewers asked questions concerning 
whether investment in the training and development of young players at EU clubs had 
changed since the introduction of the Rule and what factors were responsible for any notable 
changes. Investment was defined to include finance, infrastructure and staffing. Clubs were 
also asked about future trajectory in terms of increasing investment in youth training and 
development in relation to the impact of the Rule. 
Stage 1—the nature of the restriction  
Article 45 TFEU prohibits nationality discrimination that restricts free movement of workers 
across EU borders for Member State nationals
15
 engaged in economic activity, and in 
Bernard the CJEU confirmed that a professional footballer’s gainful employment fell within 
the scope of art.45.
16
 The cross-border element necessary for art.45 to apply is also satisfied 
as the Rule applies to the composition of club squads entering UEFA pan-European 
competitions, and cross-border movement of footballers could be impeded if a club’s 
recruitment policy is informed by whether players satisfy the eligibility criteria. 
It is also clear that free movement rules can be invoked against UEFA; art.45 is both 
vertically and horizontally directly effective so it applies to the actions of private bodies, the 
rules of which are aimed at collectively regulating gainful employment and services.
17
 This 
applies not only to bodies carrying out quasi-state functions but also to purely private 
persons.
18
 UEFA is a private collective regulator insofar as its rules determine the terms on 
which professional sportsmen can engage in gainful employment
19
 and its geographical 
location in Switzerland is also irrelevant as,  
"the rule on non-discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships in so far as these 
relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into or the place where 
they take effect [emphasis added], can be located within the territory of the EU." 
20
  
Having established that these conditions apply, it is necessary to determine whether the Rule 
amounts to a restriction under art.45, and of what nature. A professional footballer could 
object to the Rule on the*E.L. Rev. 497  grounds that it amounts to a provision which 
precludes or deters him
21
 from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right of 
freedom of movement because a number of places in a club squad are reserved exclusively 
for "locally trained" players. That limitation, and a system of penalties built into the 
regulations, is inherently liable to deter clubs from recruiting a non-national if they fail to 
meet the home grown criteria. This proposition remains unaltered by the fact that the rule 
does not place restrictions on the employment of players or on the composition of the starting 
XI. The essential purpose of a professional player’s activity is to be recruited to a team in 
order to play professional football and, as was held in Bosman, "a rule which restricts that 
participation obviously also restricts the chances of employment of the player concerned".
22
 It 
can be concluded that the Rule is intrinsically liable to restrict freedom of movement. 
However, the restrictive effect on workers does not appear to be manifest. There has been no 
uniform change in the number of foreign players in the "top five" leagues since the 
introduction of the Rule (see Figure 1). If it was having a negative effect on free movement, 
one would expect to see persistent falling numbers of expatriate players who would not have 
their contract renewed when it ended. 
 
Figure 1: Number of expatriate players in the big five leagues  
Outside the top five leagues, the labour market appears to be even more fluid, with the 
number of non-national players increasing considerably.
23
 It is therefore an interesting, 
although ultimately academic, debate as to whether the Rule restricts or promotes free 
movement generally. This is because the Rule still has the potential to restrict the cross-
border employment options of individuals and the data analysis may not fully identify causal 
effects. 
In terms of art.45 restrictions, the CJEU draws a distinction between directly and indirectly 
discriminatory measures that restrict free movement and other restrictions that are non-
discriminatory in nature. Direct discrimination is an overt form of differential treatment 
arising where a migrant worker is treated less*E.L. Rev. 498  favourably than a national 
worker, and is prohibited by art.45 and related secondary legislation. This prohibition applies 
not only to circumstances in which migrant workers are totally excluded from a particular 
activity
24
 but also to situations in which migrant workers quotas are adopted.
25
 The Rule 
places no such direct restraint on non-nationals; any non-national can qualify as a home 
grown player if he meets the relevant criteria, namely if he has been trained for three years by 
the club or (to qualify as "association-trained") a club in the same national association 
between the ages of 15 and 21. It is therefore not relevant to consider the Treaty derogations 
outlining the circumstances in which direct nationality discrimination is acceptable under EU 
law.
26
  
By contrast, indirect discrimination is a less overt form of differential treatment, but is still 
prohibited by art.45 and secondary legislation insofar as migrant workers are placed at a 
disadvantage in relation to national workers despite the contested measure being indistinctly 
applicable.
27
 Classic examples of indirectly discriminatory measures include residency 
requirements.
28
 The applicant does not need to prove that the measure in practice affected a 
higher proportion of foreign workers, but merely that the measure is intrinsically liable to 
affect migrant workers more than nationals and that there is a risk that it will place migrant 
workers at a particular disadvantage.
29
 Unlike directly discriminatory measures, indirect 
discrimination can be justified with reference to an open-ended set of justifications discussed 
below, in addition to one of the express Treaty derogations. 
The UEFA Rule is an indirectly discriminatory measure because even though it is apparently 
neutral in terms of nationality, national workers are potentially placed at an advantage over 
migrant workers. It stands to reason that nationals are more likely to meet the "locally 
trained" criteria than foreign workers simply as a consequence of their geographical location. 
As the Commission has acknowledged:  
"Although it is difficult at the moment to state with any certainty that the ‘home-grown 
players’ rule will lead to indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality, the potential risk 
of this cannot be discounted, as young players attending a training centre at a club in a 
Member State tend to be from that Member State rather than from other EU countries." 
30
  
The "sporting exception"  
The above analysis is rendered academic if it can be demonstrated that the Rule is covered by 
the "sporting exception" and falls outside the reach of the Treaty.
31
 A combined reading of [4] 
and [8] of Walrave gave rise to the so-called sporting exception in which the non-economic 
aspects of sport, or those aspects carrying economic effects but motivated by purely sporting 
interest, fell outside the reach of the Treaty prohibitions unless the rules were 
disproportionate and therefore not limited to their proper objectives.
32
 In Bosman the CJEU 
rejected, inter alia, UEFA’s claim that a rule amounting to a quota system in which clubs 
could only field three overseas players and two assimilated players (the "3+2 rule") in 
European*E.L. Rev. 499  competition fell within the sporting exception. Citing [14] and [15] 
of Donà v Mantero,
33
 it argued that although EU law does not preclude rules justified on non-
economic grounds which relate to the particular nature and context of certain matches when 
limited to its proper objective, it cannot "be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting 
activity from the scope of the Treaty".
34
 The CJEU found that the contested nationality 
clauses did not "concern specific matches between teams representing their countries but 
apply to all official matches between clubs and thus to the essence of the activity of 
professional players".
35
  
It is clear that the Rule is not covered by the purely sporting rule exception. For financial and 
prestige reasons, participation in European competitions has become a fundamental objective 
of clubs, and a club’s participation in them has become a key consideration for players 
selecting a new employer. Even in the absence of home grown player rules in domestic 
leagues, the existence of such a rule for participation in European competitions is likely to 
inform the recruitment choices of clubs who aspire to compete at this level. The Rule 
therefore affects the essence of the activity of a professional player. 
Moreover, the ability of UEFA to rely on the "purely sporting interest" exception has been 
undermined by the CJEU’s more recent approach to the sporting exception in Meca-Medina 
in which it stated that,  
"the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing 
from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the 
body which has laid it down." 
36
  
It went on to find that where the activity fell within the scope of the Treaty, the rules 
governing it must satisfy the Treaty’s provisions, including ensuring free movement of 
workers.
37
 In other words, the purely sporting interest defence no longer applies to sport 
except in relation to the composition of national teams and, arguably, to a narrow set of "rules 
of the game" which carry no or very marginal economic effects. The home grown player rule 
cannot therefore be automatically removed from the scope of the TFEU without systematic 
analysis to establish whether the contested measure amounts to a restriction or not. 
Nevertheless, not all contested rules falling within the scope of the Treaty will be condemned. 
In Meca-Medina, the CJEU established that while the contested anti-doping rules were not of 
purely sporting interest, they still did not infringe the Treaty’s competition prohibitions 
because they were "inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and 
its very purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes".
38
 However, such restraints 
cease to be necessary when they are disproportionate.
39
 In applying the inherency test, the 
CJEU stated that account must be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the 
association of undertakings was taken and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to 
be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the 
pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them.
40
  
This approach, although developed in the context of the European Union’s competition 
provisions, is appropriate for transposition in art.45 disputes
41
 and has already found 
expression in the free movement*E.L. Rev. 500  case of Deliège. Here, the CJEU argued that 
selection rules for high profile international tournaments did not restrict access to the labour 
market
42
 because, inter alia, rules,  
"inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports event might not in law constitute 
restrictions on free movement even if they in fact involved some restrictive criteria being 
adopted." 
43
  
The CJEU ruled that "it naturally falls to the bodies concerned … to lay down appropriate 
rules and to make their selections in accordance with them",
44
 because governing bodies 
possess, "the necessary knowledge and experience; to exercise such judgement and that this 
is the arrangement normally adopted in most sporting disciplines".
45
 Provided that it derived 
from a need inherent in the competition’s organisation, a limit on the number of competitors 
that could be selected did not restrict the freedom to provide services.
46
  
However, UEFA’s home grown player rule does not derive from a need inherent in the 
organisation of the competitions. UEFA competitions (most strikingly the Champions League) 
thrived in terms of sporting integrity, public interest and commercial income prior to the 
Rule’s introduction and no evidence has been put forward that they could not continue to do 
so in its absence. Furthermore, in Deliège and Meca-Medina, the CJEU limited its acceptance 
of rules "inherent" to the organisation of sport to non-discriminatory rules that bore no 
relationship to nationality, whereas the home grown player rule amounts to indirect 
discrimination. It should also be recalled that even rules categorised as "inherent" must still 
satisfy the requirements of proportionality control. 
Articles 6 and 165 TFEU  
The proposition that the Rule cannot be saved with reference to the "purely sporting" or 
"inherent rule" defence is not adjusted by the existence of art.6 and art.165 TFEU. Article 6 
establishes sport as a third tier supporting competence of the European Union. Sport is 
located in subs.(e): education, vocational training, youth and sport, and art.165(1) specifically 
provides that the Union shall take "account of the specific nature of sport", although this does 
not unequivocally establish this provision as a horizontal obligation which applies to the 
exercise of other EU powers such as free movement and competition law. This contrasts with 
other areas of the Treaty in which horizontal obligations can be identified such as in the areas 
of environmental protection.
47
 This means that it cannot be assumed that art.165 offers the 
Rule any additional protection from EU law. The CJEU jurisprudence on art.165 is not 
currently sufficiently developed to allow for definitive statements on this question; in 
Bernard, the CJEU employed art.165 to "corroborate" its view that the specific characteristics 
of sport should be taken into account in the application of EU law.
48
 From this statement, it 
appears that the CJEU prefers the well-trodden path of objective justification albeit 
acknowledging that art.165 informs that assessment. 
Article 165(2) establishes that:  
"Union action shall be aimed at: developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting 
fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible 
for sports, and*E.L. Rev. 501  by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen 
and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen." 
Regardless of the horizontal question, art.165(2) is likely to carry persuasive authority within 
the context of the exercise of other Treaty competences relevant to sport. In relation to the 
home grown player debate, it is likely to be cited by both those wishing to support and attack 
the rule on the "fairness and openness" question.
49
 Similarly, the Rule requires assessment in 
relation to the Treaty objective of protecting minors in sport. 
The relevance of art.165 lies not only in shaping what is to be considered a legitimate 
objective, but in considering which measures, taking into account the specific nature of sport 
and questions of fairness and openness, are considered suitable and necessary for the 
attainment of these objectives. It has been assumed in some quarters that the existence of 
art.165 adjusts the proposition that sport is subject to EU law. This assumption must be 
rejected—sporting activity, including the home grown player rule, is still subject to European 
law. It is possible that art.165 might adjust the sensitivity to which EU law is applied to sport 
but in this regard it is difficult to discern from the existing jurisprudence of the CJEU and the 
decisional practice of the Commission a pattern of insensitive application of EU law to sport. 
Stage 2—justified by imperative requirements in the general interest  
Determining that the Rule amounts to indirect nationality discrimination and a restriction on a 
worker’s free movement does not, in itself, lead to a finding of incompatibility with art.45. 
Indirectly discriminatory restrictions are compatible with freedom of movement if they can 
be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest. There is significant CJEU 
jurisprudence (albeit primarily pre-art.165) on the question of what amounts to a set of 
imperative requirements specific to sport. For example, in Bosman the Court referred to the 
legitimacy of rules designed at "maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain 
degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and 
training of young players".
50
 In Lehtonen, the CJEU established that transfer windows could, 
subject to proportionality control, be compatible with EU law because late transfers could call 
into question the proper functioning of sporting competition.
51
 In Meca-Medina it recognised 
as legitimate the need to "combat doping in order for competitive sport to be conducted 
fairly", safeguard "equal chances for athletes, athletes’ health", ensure "the integrity and 
objectivity of competitive sport" and protect "ethical values in sport".
52
 In Bernard it held 
that a system of training compensation in sport which restricts the freedom of movement of 
players could be justified with reference to the objective of educating and training young 
players.
53
  
From this jurisprudence can be synthesised the following legitimate objectives applicable to 
sport: preserving competitive balance; encouraging the recruitment and training of young 
players; maintaining the proper functioning of competitions; maintaining the integrity, 
objectivity and ethical values of sport. It must be stressed that this is not a closed list of 
justifications and others can be developed by the CJEU. Nonetheless, according to existing 
jurisprudence, the twin stated objectives of the Rule—preserving a*E.L. Rev. 
502  competitive balance between clubs and encouraging the training and development of 
young players—are legitimate. This view is supported by the European Parliament and the 
European Commission,
54
 although concern has been expressed about the high attrition rate 
for young footballers, combined with the side-lining of a young player’s general educational 
needs.
55
  
Stage 3—the suitability test  
Even where the CJEU accepts that an indirectly or non-discriminatory measure pursues a 
legitimate objective, the third and fourth strands of the Gebhard test must still be satisfied. 
The suitability of the measure for securing the attainment of its objective and that the 
measure does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it must both be demonstrated. 
This is often referred to as the suitability and necessity test. The first is essentially a "means 
and end test" while the second involves balancing competing interests. Again, the burden of 
proof lies with the party imposing the measure. Tridimas claims that when assessing the 
proportionality of a measure the CJEU adopts a more intensive level of scrutiny when 
reviewing national measures than EU ones.
56
 However, within the sporting context some 
commentators take the view that:  
"Taking into consideration the Court’s awareness about the EU’s limited competence in 
sporting affairs and the corresponding conditional regulatory autonomy of the sporting 
federations, and also the societal relevance of sport, it is possible that the Court’s review of 
the tests of suitability and necessity in a sporting context will be merely marginal." 
57
  
A review of CJEU jurisprudence reveals varying practice on the intensity with which sporting 
rules and practices are subject to proportionality control. In Bosman the CJEU subjected both 
transfer and nationality rules to a stringent test of suitability by dismissing the expertise and 
regulatory autonomy claimed by the party imposing the measure. It went on to state that the 
stated objectives of the transfer system could be achieved at least as efficiently by other 
means which did not impede freedom of movement for workers, thus demonstrating a similar 
stringency towards the test of necessity.
58
 In Deliège it was more receptive to claims that 
sports governing bodies possessed "the necessary knowledge and experience"
59
 required in 
order "to lay down appropriate rules" for competition.
60
 In Meca-Medina, the CJEU was 
similarly unwilling to subject the contested doping thresholds to thorough scrutiny.
61
 In 
Lehtonen, a failure to satisfy proportionality control led to the transfer window system in 
international basketball being condemned, but the Court accepted that transfer windows could, 
in principle, be compatible with EU law.
62
 In Bernard, the CJEU accepted as legitimate 
schemes providing for compensation payments where a young player signed a professional 
contract with a club other than the one which trained him; such a payment was justified, "by 
the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players".
63
 However, it 
went on to rule that the contested scheme went beyond what was necessary to encourage and 
fund those*E.L. Rev. 503  activities
64
 because damages were not calculated in relation to the 
actual training costs incurred by the club.
65
  
The suitability test and competitive balance  
The extent of fluctuation in competitive imbalance in European competitions is revealed in 
Figure 2. In 1992, 20 teams may have expected to reach the quarter-finals of the European 
Cup and UEFA Cup at least once in a three-year time period, but this number declined from 
the mid-1990s to 15 or 16 clubs at the beginning of the 2000s. Since 2008 there appears to 
have been a reversal in this trend, with consecutive increases in the number of teams 
qualifying for the quarter-final stage since. This is not a conductive measure and it is doubtful 
that it indicates an effect of the Rule. 
 
Figure 2: Number of teams reaching the quarter-finals in the previous three years  
There are still concerns that a small number of wealthy clubs tend to dominate the later stages 
of European competition, particularly those from the commercially dominant leagues. Figure 
3 highlights this trend, showing the proportion of clubs reaching the semi-finals of the UEFA 
Champions League from 2006 to 2012. All clubs reaching this stage have been from the big 
five European leagues. 
 
Figure 3: Origin of clubs reaching the semi-finals of European competitions 2006–2012*E.L. 
Rev. 504   
In order to examine the impact of the Rule on the performance of teams, and hence indirectly 
examine the effects on competitive balance controlling for other factors, regression analysis 
was performed. This was undertaken separately for the UEFA Champions League and 
Europa League tournaments, and for the performance of teams in the group stages, and then 
their progression through to the various final stages of the competition. Overall the statistics 
measuring competitive balance suggested that the impact of the Rule has been to rebalance 
the performance of teams across both competitions by reducing the success of teams finishing 
in the top two places of the Champions League group stage or the top three places of the 
Europa League group stage in favour of those towards the bottom. There is very little 
evidence to suggest that the Rule affects the final stages in either competition. 
In the group stages of the Champions League the evidence is consistent with the Rule 
constraining the performance of the commercially bigger clubs who would previously have 
been most likely to have employed more players from outside their home association. This 
has the effect of making the outcome of the group stages of the competition more uncertain. 
The largest impact has been through association-trained players, with those teams naming 
relatively more home grown players in their squad experiencing a reduction in performance. 
The implication of this is that for clubs having to retain players from within a more localised 
(i.e. national) market, team performance falls. Statistically the results showed that the effect 
was relatively small at this stage and typically less than 0.5 per cent, although this could 
increase to 1.5 per cent for the total of association-trained players in the Champions League. 
This would imply that as the number of association-trained players increases by one, there is 
a 1.5 per cent chance that a team could fall from finishing second in the group stages, 
therefore missing out on qualification for the knockout stages. When the Rule is measured on 
a seasonal basis (as opposed to averages across intervention periods) the impact is more 
marked, with the results suggesting that the Rule could increase the chances of a team falling 
from second place by approximately 12 per cent. The statistics for club-trained players did 
not support a negative impact. While the Rule had a small but statistically significant impact 
on the group stages of the Champions League, it had no impact on the knockout stages. The 
implication is that the best teams generally have gravitated towards this level of competition 
regardless of constraints on squads. 
In the group stages of the Europa League a similar pattern of results was observed, but the 
impact of the Rule was less statistically significant. While the same reduction in performance 
was seen, the only statistically significant impact related to association-trained players, with 
the same implication as above. In the case of the finals’ stage of the Europa League there was 
some limited evidence of a contrary effect to the Champions League results. There was 
evidence of a positive effect on the quarter-final and semi-final achievement of teams if 
measured on a season-by-season basis. The findings also showed that more home grown 
players, particularly club-trained players, improved the success of teams at this level, with the 
implication that clubs with more club-trained players were more likely to progress at this 
stage. This suggested that the rule has had the effect of making such teams potentially more 
competitive vis-à-vis Champions League teams, in the sense that they can gain access to this 
competition. Within the Europa League, this probably means that the better nationally trained 
players tend to be located at the relatively successful clubs, and cannot then get easily 
switched to Champions League clubs. 
There was insufficient data to make an accurate scientific assessment of trajectory. 
Experience from the regulation of player markets in other sports shows that it is possible we 
have already seen the full impact on competitive balance of association-trained players and 
that this will not increase, and may even reduce, in future.
66
 It is equally possible that there 
will be an additional gradual increase in competitive balance as club-trained players start to 
have a greater impact on the composition of first team squads. It would therefore be unwise 
to speculate on either a future increase or decrease in competitive balance as*E.L. Rev. 505  a 
result of the Rule; for the purposes of the application of the suitability rule, future trajectory 
should be viewed as neutral. 
The suitability test and youth development  
The home grown player rule potentially complements existing UEFA measures designed to 
promote youth development. The UEFA club licensing system aims to "further promote and 
continuously improve the standard of all aspects of football in Europe and to give continued 
priority to the training and care of young players in every club".
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 Clubs entering UEFA club 
competitions must possess a licence issued by the relevant national association or league, 
having met a number of criteria including a satisfactory youth development programme.
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The home grown player rule represents a regulatory extension of this licensing system insofar 
as clubs must tangibly demonstrate that their youth development programmes are producing 
players of sufficient quality. However, it is a matter for debate whether the issuance of the 
licence is in itself a sufficient guarantee of youth development standards or whether the home 
grown player rule is a justifiable additional requirement. In other words, a robustly enforced 
licensing system (which the Commission supports)
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 could achieve the desired outcomes 
without the need to adopt labour market measures tainted by discriminatory effects. 
Moreover, our data indicated that the Rule has so far had a very limited impact on youth 
player training and development throughout the European Union. Statistical analysis of the 
number of minutes played by under-21 players in UEFA competitions (which should reflect 
the quality of youth training and development schemes) indicated that while there has been a 
significant increase in the number of young players competing in the 12 years post-2001, this 
increase was largely in the period 2001–2006, before the Rule was introduced. In comparison, 
the period following the introduction of the rule (and its extension in 2008) showed a 
significant reduction in the rate of this increase (see Figure 4). It is possible that this indicates 
both a lack of suitability for the Rule to achieve its aims in this respect and may also question 
the need for the Rule’s introduction in the first place in terms of improving youth training and 
development. One could also speculate that some of this increase in the latter stages of the 
2001–2006 period was connected with UEFA’s announcement of its intention to introduce 
this Rule.*E.L. Rev. 506   
 
Figure 4: Average number of club trained and under-21 players on the pitch for UCL Group 
Stage clubs  
Qualitative data gathered suggested that the 2001–2006 increases in under-21 participants 
were unconnected with the Rule; the vast majority of clubs interviewed indicated that they 
believed the Rule had little or no impact on their youth training and development strategies or 
investment. Primarily clubs believed this to be the case because the Rule did not have 
sufficient "bite" to increase the number of club- or association-trained players included in the 
vast majority of first team squads and because it only had an impact on a small minority of 
clubs (i.e. those regularly qualifying for UEFA competitions). 
These findings contrasted with the statistical analysis showing that the number of home 
grown players participating in UEFA competitions has increased since the introduction of the 
Rule. However, our data suggested that this is predominantly due to factors other than the 
introduction and extension of the Rule. The major factors identified by clubs and stakeholders 
were: domestic player eligibility rules which are often more restrictive; domestic or European 
licensing requirements; domestic incentivised player development schemes; a club’s financial 
situation (both chronic and acute); local or global economic pressures; and a club’s "ethos" or 
"tradition". 
Some of these factors are more transient than others, meaning that over time non-regulatory 
forces, such as economic conditions and club philosophy, may encourage or discourage 
investment in youth development. It is possible that a regulatory measure, such as the Rule, 
may offer a more permanent incentivising effect to invest in youth and rely less on the market 
to fill club squads, meaning that the potential benefits of the Rule may be presented in the 
longer term. However, we did not find any evidence for the potential for an upward (or 
downward) future trajectory in terms of investment in, or quality of, youth development as a 
result of the Rule remaining in existence in its current form. Furthermore, the trajectory 
analysis will remain problematic in the future given the difficulty in isolating the Rule’s 
effect from the influence of other factors, including other UEFA regulations.
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 Moreover, the 
remit of the Study was to assess whether the Rule achieved its outcomes in improving the 
training and development of young EU players at the current time. Our conclusion is that the 
Rule’s effect has been minimal, discordant, and*E.L. Rev. 507  less significant than other 
concurrent regulatory and economic factors. Therefore in terms of our legal assessment under 
this objective, the Rule is neutral or at best only marginally positive. 
It should also be noted that a number of stakeholders identified a negative impact of the Rule 
because it incentivises the "poaching" of young players from competitor club academies. 
While "poaching" has the effect of promoting the cross-border movement of players, it 
potentially has three negative effects. First, most stakeholders agree that a child’s education 
and training is generally best served when that education and training takes place in such a 
way as not to disturb their home life; relocating a child for the purpose of pursuing a career in 
professional football can be destabilising. Secondly, the poaching of players can provide 
disincentives to particularly small and medium-sized clubs to develop young talent. Thirdly, 
if larger clubs are able to poach young players, the "feeder" clubs are placed at a disadvantage, 
raising concerns about competitive balance. 
Stage 4—the necessity test  
The test of necessity in EU law requires that the contested measure under scrutiny does not 
go beyond what is necessary in order to secure the stated legitimate objectives and that where 
no less restrictive alternatives exist, the contested measure must not have an excessive or 
disproportionate effect, or the disadvantage caused by the measure is proportionate to the 
benefit of the aims pursued. This means that a court could consider a measure as being 
suitable and necessary but that it could still fail proportionality control because the burden 
placed on the complainant by the measure is disproportionate to the benefits secured.
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The neutral or very limited positive effect of the Rule in terms of the legitimate objectives of 
improving competitive balance and the training and development of young EU players must 
be balanced against the potentially negative effects of the Rule in restricting the free 
movement of EU workers through its potential indirectly discriminatory effect. As we have 
set out above, although there is some identifiable progress in terms of meeting the objectively 
legitimate aims (particularly with regard to competitive balance in the Champions League 
group stage) these gains are very limited. 
However, the identifiable negative impact upon the free movement of EU players also 
appears to be very limited. It should be remembered that proof of indirect discrimination does 
not require the applicant to prove that the national measure in practice affects a higher 
proportion of foreign workers, but merely that the measure is intrinsically liable to affect 
migrant workers more than nationals and that there is a risk that it will place the former at a 
particular disadvantage. Our findings suggest that the Rule in its current form is intrinsically 
liable to have this effect because it has an impact (albeit a very limited one) on whether home 
grown players are selected for first team squads ahead of non-home grown (usually non-
national) players. However, while this assessment assists in establishing whether a restriction 
can be identified, it does not necessarily mean that the Rule is disproportionate. The actual 
impact on the free movement of players is important here, and to date we have not identified 
any formal legal challenge to the Rule in domestic or European courts. This may be because 
players—with very short career lifespans—may be reluctant to challenge the dominant 
authorities, particularly bearing in mind the time it takes for the CJEU to hear a case.
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However, it is also conceivable that the main reason for the lack of complaints is that the 
Rule has adversely affected very few players. As the authors of the Commission’s 2008 study 
on training of young sportsmen/women in Europe argue, "a professional football player may 
exercise its [sic] activity very easily in Europe without having the status of home-grown 
player" because*E.L. Rev. 508  the maximum restriction is currently only 8 out of 25 and the 
restriction does not apply to the fielding of players.
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From the above, a case can be made that the Rule, in its current form, is proportionate insofar 
as its apparently limited restrictive effects do not appear to be disproportionate to the modest 
benefits generated thus far. This proposition can, however, be undermined by two 
considerations. First, should the benefits of the Rule diminish over time, the cost/benefit 
balance would shift, thus rendering current proportionality arguments less persuasive. More 
significant at the current time is the existence of alternative measures that could potentially 
achieve a more uniform and substantive effect in terms of competitive balance and youth 
training and development and be less restrictive on the fundamental freedoms of EU workers. 
If this were the case, the proportionality of the measure could not be made out even in light of 
the apparently insignificant effect on EU players. 
Amending the Rule  
The most intuitive way to soften the restrictive effects of the Rule would be to reduce the 
number of home grown players that a club needs to register in its UEFA squad. The number 
of players potentially affected would therefore be reduced, although the potential effect on 
some players on the grounds of their nationality would still remain. However, proportionality 
control in EU law does not require that all restrictions are eliminated—the issue is whether 
the restrictive effects of the measure go beyond what is necessary to secure the stated 
legitimate objectives and whether the restrictive effects are disproportionate to the gains 
secured. In this regard, our data suggests that a reduction in the number of home grown 
players would reduce the already limited positive impact on competitive balance. Reducing 
the "bite" of the Rule will therefore reduce its chance of being considered suitable under 
freedom of movement laws because it would be achieving its objectives to a lesser effect. 
Our Study also considered whether the discriminatory effect of the Rule would be reduced by 
removing the "association-trained" aspect and instead classifying home grown players only as 
those trained by the club for which they are registered. It is the "association-trained" aspect of 
the Rule that has led many commentators to take the view that it has a discriminatory 
objective rather than merely an indirect discriminatory effect (although under EU law the 
difference between the two is irrelevant). Three considerations point to a rejection of this 
approach. First, our analysis of the competitive balance data suggests that the use of 
association-trained players played the major role in reducing the success of the higher ranked 
teams in the Champions League group stages. Secondly, some clubs with smaller incomes 
suggested that the association-trained part of the rule enabled them to draw income from 
larger clubs belonging to their association through transfer fees and training compensation, 
incentivising youth development.
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 Thirdly, removing the association-trained aspect could 
encourage larger clubs to recruit players from competitors at an earlier age. 
A less intuitive method to satisfy proportionality is to increase the restrictions on the number 
of home grown players that have to be listed in a club’s squad. This would increase the bite 
of the Rule insofar as our data suggests it would be likely to increase competitive balance in 
UEFA competitions (in the group stages at least). It is also possible that it may have a more 
identifiable impact upon investment in training and development of young players, 
particularly at clubs with the greater incomes and those based in the "big five" leagues. These 
potential gains must, however, be weighed against the impact a strengthening of the Rule 
would have on a worker’s circulation within the internal market (and indeed on a club’s*E.L. 
Rev. 509  recruitment choices). Given that our data supports the view that a modest increase 
in the quota could result in a similar increase in competitive balance, a case could be made 
that a slightly strengthened rule may satisfy proportionality control on these grounds. Any 
such increase would need to be subject to future investigation looking at the impact of the 
change. However, expanding the quota should only be considered if less restrictive 
alternative measures do not exist. 
Alternative regulatory measures  
There are a number of alternative sporting regulatory measures that have the potential to 
secure the objectives of promoting competitive balance and youth training and development 
within the European professional football sector. It was beyond the scope of the Study to 
assess the extent to which these alternative measures represented "least restrictive 
alternatives" to the Rule, or the extent to which these measures were likely to achieve more 
significant and uniform improvements to competitive balance and investment in young player 
development. Indeed, on first appearance and without the benefit of additional research, some 
of the alternative measures listed below appear likely to interfere with fundamental freedoms 
in a more restrictive manner than the current Rule. In this connection, the research team did 
not conduct an assessment of the legality of the measures under either EU free movement or 
competition laws. Nevertheless, and with this caveat in mind, UEFA should consider, 
following discussions with stakeholders, whether the adoption of one or more of the 
following alternatives would achieve its legitimate aims more successfully, and provide fewer 
restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of professional players. In particular, UEFA should 
consider the benefits of measures that do not give rise to discriminatory effects. 
In discussing alternative regulatory measures, a general observation can be made that 
regulatory interventions within the professional football sector can take two forms: those 
affecting the product market (measures affecting clubs) and those affecting the labour market 
(measures affecting players). It stands to reason that interventions in the labour market are 
more likely to affect the rights of workers whereas product market interventions are more 
likely to affect the rights of clubs (thus potentially engaging EU competition law). Product 
market interventions are, therefore, less likely to offend EU free movement of workers 
principles. 
Product market interventions include: club licensing schemes requiring clubs to provide high 
quality youth development programmes; cost control measures such as "Financial Fair Play" 
and salary caps; financial inducements to develop young players; revenue sharing schemes; 
product market liberalisation, thus allowing clubs to benefit from free movement rights 
enjoyed by players. Labour market interventions include: requiring a player to sign his first 
professional contract with the club that trained him; the introduction of international contracts 
for players under the age of 18 which would allow for a uniform means for training clubs to 
contract their academy players throughout the world; lengthening the maximum term of 
contracts for players under the age of 18; reforming the training compensation scheme to 
provide greater club incentives for youth development; restricting the transfer of minors, and 
imposing squad size limits.
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It is not desirable for governing bodies, faced with objections to their current player 
eligibility rules, to simply reconfigure directly discriminatory restrictions so that they gain the 
appearance of apparently more benign indirectly discriminatory measures without having first 
systematically established why non-discriminatory alternatives, particularly those located 
outwith the labour market, are not suitable. Consequently, before the Rule can categorically 
be described as compatible with EU free movement law,*E.L. Rev. 510  less restrictive 
alternatives should first be examined, particularly those that do not carry discriminatory 
effects and are not located within the labour market. 
Conclusions  
UEFA’s home grown player rule has resulted in improvements to competitive balance in 
European club competitions, but these improvements are very modest. Despite increases in 
the number of home grown players at EU clubs, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
Rule has improved the quality of youth development in European football. It is intrinsically 
liable to restrict the free movement of professional footballers and it is not possible, at this 
stage, to state that its benefits outweigh its restrictive effects. The proportionality of the Rule 
cannot be categorically established until UEFA demonstrates that less restrictive alternative 
measures are ill equipped at securing its objectives. However, rather than adopting a negative 
position on the Rule, the European Commission should extend an invitation to UEFA to 
consult with key stakeholders on how alternative measures that do not carry discriminatory 
effects can deliver more substantial benefits for European football. Only when the outcome of 
these discussions and viability studies are known can it be established whether the 
proportionality of the Rule has been made out. 
In the White Paper on Sport, the Commission suggested that governance issues in sport 
should fall within a territory of autonomy and that most challenges can be addressed through 
self-regulation which must, however, be "respectful of good governance principles".
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 While 
the experience and expertise of the governing body seeking to introduce new regulatory 
measures should be acknowledged, the exercise of its regulatory discretion should take into 
account the views of stakeholders who are subject to new rules, particularly those 
representing the two sides of the sports industry, the clubs and the players. One important 
governance standard recommended in the White Paper was the use of social dialogue in the 
sports sector which,  
"can contribute to addressing common concerns of employers and athletes, including 
agreements on employment relations and working conditions in the sector in accordance with 
EC Treaty provisions." 
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The social dialogue committee in European professional football established in 2008 could be 
one such forum through which the home grown player rule and alternative or additional 
regulatory measures could be discussed, although the committee’s existing rules of procedure 
dictate that items for discussion within the social dialogue committee are first discussed 
within UEFA’s Professional Football Strategy Council. Consequently, UEFA should make 
use of the professional football social dialogue committee and the European Union should 
offer sports bodies a wide margin of appreciation when assessing rules that have been openly 
and democratically debated and agreed by representative sports stakeholders. 
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